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More than 100 million Americans invest $25 trillion in mutual funds and 
exchange-traded funds (collectively, “funds”) regulated by the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (the “Act”), making funds the predominant investment 
vehicle in the United States.1 Everyday investors rely on funds to save for re-
tirement, pay for college, and seek financial security.2 In this way, funds 
demonstrate how “Wall Street” can connect with “Main Street” to improve peo-
ple’s lives.
By way of background, funds are created by investment advisers (“advis-
ers”) that provide investment advisory (e.g., stock selection) and other services 
to their funds in exchange for a fee. Investors purchase shares of a fund, which 
represent a pro-rata interest in the fund’s net assets—essentially, the securities 
chosen by the adviser—with the hope that the value of those assets, and in turn, 
the value of the fund, will appreciate. Although managing a fund is expensive, 
pooling investments from the public allows an adviser to spread its costs over 
an entire fund, which allows professional money management to be affordable 
for all.
* B.A., Swarthmore College, 2004; J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School, Order of the 
Coif, 2007. Mr. Weiner serves as counsel to a registered investment adviser and broker-dealer.
1. INV. CO. INST., INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, at *i, *31 (2020).
2. Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs, Investment Company Act Re-
lease No. 31835, 80 Fed. Reg. 62274, 62276 (proposed Oct. 15, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
§ 270.22e-4).
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Prior to the Act, the unique structural aspects of funds, coupled with a lack 
of regulation,3 enabled rogue4 advisers to put their own interests ahead of those 
of fund shareholders.5 These structural aspects include that a fund typically re-
lies on its adviser, which seeks to make a profit, to manage its day-to-day opera-
tions.6 Before 1940, adviser personnel also dominated the boards of directors 
of funds, which are responsible for overseeing the adviser and negotiating its 
compensation.7 This made funds susceptible to rogue advisers that were more 
interested in managing funds to benefit themselves and their “affiliates” (i.e.,
their employees and related businesses), as opposed to increasing the value of 
their funds.8
3. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES:
ABUSES AND DEFICIENCIES IN THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND 
INVESTMENT COMPANIES, H.R. DOC. 76-279, at 63 (1939) [hereinafter SEC REPORT] (Prior to the 
Act, specific statutory restraints or governmental regulations “were virtually [absent].”). The SEC 
Report, which runs thousands of pages and took years to complete, was prepared by the SEC at the 
direction of Congress (pursuant to Section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935) 
after criticism of the fund industry began to mount. In particular, Congress requested the SEC to 
consider “the influence exerted by interests affiliated with the management of such trusts and com-
panies upon their investment policies.”
4. The term “rogue” is used to convey that most advisers did not engage in the abuses de-
scribed herein. See S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 4–5 (June 6, 1940) (“The committee, in recommending 
this regulatory legislation, does not mean to imply that most [funds] at present operating in this 
country were guilty of unfair practices or were mismanaged.”). For this reason, the fund industry 
enthusiastically supported the passage of the Act in an effort to prevent the sins of the few from tar-
nishing the reputations of many. See id. at 12 (“The industry asserted, and the Commission and the 
committee believe, that this legislation will tend to prevent those abuses which have been a stigma 
upon and impaired the usefulness of the investment trust industry as a whole.”).
5. See Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Sub-
comm. of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., at 37 (1940) [hereinafter Senate Hear-
ings] (Robert E. Healy, SEC Commissioner testified that “I am constrained to state that too often 
[funds] were organized and operated as adjuncts to the business of the sponsors and insiders to ad-
vance their personal interest at the expense of and to the detriment of their stockholders.”); see also
Alfred Jaretzki, Jr., The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WASH. U. L. Q. 303, 317 (1941) (“The 
charge had been made that investment companies frequently were operated, not primarily in the 
interests of their stockholders, but in the interests of controlling groups or groups represented on the 
board of directors.”).
6. See Jones v. Harris Assocs., 559 U.S. 335, 338–39 (2010).
7. See SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 1919 (describing fund management contracts “em-
powering the manager to nominate several or all of the directors and officers of the investment 
company, or requiring approval by the manager of the directors elected by the stockholders.”); see 
also Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 38 (Healy testified that “[b]oards of directors often consist 
solely or predominantly of representatives of banking, brokerage, or distributor sponsors.”); see also
Comment, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 50 YALE L. J. 440, 448 (1941) [hereinafter Com-
ment] (noting the Act was going to “result in a big shake-up in substantial institutions such as the 
Lehman Corporation, for instance, all of whose directors are connected with Lehman Brothers”).
8. Section 2(a)(3) of the Act defines an “affiliated person” to include, among other things, 
persons or entities with certain degrees of ownership or control over others, business entities under 
the same corporate umbrella, and various corporate actors of such entities. The Act’s legislative 
history is replete with examples of improper affiliated transactions. See SEC REPORT, supra note 3, 
at 22 (collecting examples); see Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 37 (Healy testifying to same).
Fall 2020] Investment Company Act of 1940 69
Recognizing the vital role that funds play for both the overall economy9 and 
the citizen of “small means,”10 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
and the fund industry worked together to draft the Act, which Congress passed 
unanimously.11 The incredible growth of funds over the past 80 years is often 
attributed to the oversight and direction provided by the Act, which regulates all 
facets of fund operations and is arguably the most complex of our nation’s secu-
rities laws.12
Understanding the policy concerns that led to the Act helps to cut through 
that complexity and make sense of the Act’s provisions.13 As a result, this arti-
cle focuses on those concerns, which can be thought of as guiding “Principles,”
to demonstrate how the Act seeks to: (1) prevent insiders from taking advantage 
of funds they manage; (2) require effective disclosure; and (3) ensure the equi-
table treatment of shareholders.
The Principles make the Act easier to apply by serving as shoal markers for 
conduct to avoid. And, just as a buoy indicates danger to one side and safety to 
the other, the Principles also help to delineate between bona fide conduct and 
that which to steer clear of. The Principles are thus a useful lens for interpreting 
9. See S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 4–5 (noting that funds are “vitally associated with the na-
tional economy” due to their popularity, substantial holdings in various industries, and ability to 
inject new capital into the economy); see also Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hear-
ings on H.R. 10065 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th 
Cong., at 54–55 (1940) [hereinafter House Hearings] (Healy testifying to same).
10. Jaretzki, supra note 5, at 308; Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 227 (David Schenker, 
Chief Counsel of the SEC Report, testified that “[w]e say fundamentally this business is a business 
of furnishing management advice to small investors.”).
11. See 86 CONG. REC. 8843 (1940) (Sen. Robert F. Wagner stated that “[i]t is almost a mir-
acle. I have never known to happen in my experience as a legislator that the industry affected has 
sought such regulation. There was not a dissenting voice heard from the entire industry affected 
against the passage of this regulation.”); S. Rep. NO. 76-1775, at 2 (noting the Act “has the distinc-
tion of having the virtually unanimous support of the persons for whose regulation it provides, as 
well as of the regulatory agency by which it is to be administered.”); Senate Hearings, supra note 5, 
at 1106 (Healy testifying to same); id. at 1109 (Alfred Jaretzki, Jr., an attorney testifying on behalf 
of the fund industry, stated that “[w]e feel that it would be helpful not only to the industry to have 
this legislation passed now, but also we feel that it is a very healthy sign that Government and in-
dustry can come together and do a constructive job of this kind.”). It is worth noting that even 
though the initial attempt at drafting the Act failed, the SEC and the fund industry worked at a fe-
verish pace to “reach a common ground . . . . [As] a “result of their cooperative efforts, the substi-
tute bill . . . was drafted.” S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 1; see also Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 1108 
(Jaretzki testified that “working day and night with the [SEC’s] staff, we were able to put into lan-
guage the bill that was presented to you.”).
12. See, e.g., Paul Roye, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Keynote Address at the FEFSI General 
Membership Meeting (Sept. 22, 2000) (transcript available on the U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n 
website: https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch402.htm) (“[T]he reach of the . . . Act extends be-
yond mere disclosure and reporting requirements. It places substantive restrictions on virtually eve-
ry aspect of the operations of investment companies; their governance and structure, their issuance 
of debt and other senior securities, their investments, sales and redemptions of their shares, and, 
perhaps most importantly, their dealings with service providers and other affiliates.”).
13. See, e.g., Jaretzki, supra note 5, at 303 (“[T]he Act must be read in the light of the nature 
of the industry and the problems sought to be corrected.”).
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the Act, particularly when considering novel situations or whether, per the 
“rubber” built into the Act,14 exemptive or other relief is appropriate. In these 
instances, harnessing the history and purpose of the Act can help advisers, fund 
directors, practitioners, and regulators apply the Act and ensure that funds re-
main a driver of national and, most importantly, investor gain.
I. PRINCIPLE NO. 1: PREVENTING OVERREACHING BY FUND INSIDERS
As mentioned above, an adviser generally manages the daily affairs of its 
funds, which do not have employees of their own and instead rely on the adviser 
to provide the services necessary for their operation. Such day-to-day manage-
ment, however, creates an “opportunity for gross abuse by unscrupulous per-
sons.”15 This is because a rogue adviser, acting through the same employees 
who run the fund, can force the fund to do as the adviser pleases.16 With “self-
dealing” leading to losses for fund shareholders,17 the SEC and the fund indus-
try recommended that the Act include strategic measures to implement inde-
pendent oversight of fund management as well as targeted measures to address 
common forms of self-dealing.18
14. Commissioner Robert A. Healy, in his testimony before the Senate, proffered that due to 
the complexity associated with funds, “the Senators will find that it is necessary to put a little rubber 
into the bill for the exceptional, unforeseeable and unpredictable cases.” Senate Hearings, supra 
note 5, at 45, 313; see also House Hearings, supra note 9, at 120 (Schenker noted Section “6(c) is 
the broad exemptive power in the Commission which was deliberately inserted with the universal 
approval of the industry, to give the power to the Commission to meet situations which were not 
known.”). Section 6(c) authorizes the SEC “to exempt any person, security, or transaction” from the 
provisions of the Act when doing so is “appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the 
protection of investors and the purposes” of the Act. This “rubber” can also be found in “no-action”
relief. If an industry participant is unsure of the legality of an action, the participant may pose the 
question to the SEC staff and ask for a no-action letter stating that based on the facts involved, the 
“SEC staff would not recommend that the Commission take enforcement action against the re-
quester . . . .” U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, NO ACTION LETTERS, https://www.investor.gov/intro
duction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/no-action-letters.
15. House Hearings, supra note 9, at 59 (Healy).
16. SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 1918 (“In practice, the individuals holding management 
contracts have a dominating influence over the assets and investment policies of an investment 
company so long as the contract endures.”).
17. Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 216 (L.M.C. Smith, Associate Counsel of the SEC 
Report, describing “statistical proof that these fellows go back to their investment companies when 
they need money”); see also SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 22 (collecting examples of self-dealing). 
Self-dealing was even problematic when advisers sought to act fairly. See S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 7 
(“The industry recognized that, even for the most conscientious managements, transactions between 
these affiliated persons and the investment companies present many difficulties.”); see also Senate 
Hearings, supra note 5, at 207 (Smith noted that “some of the serious losses have come from people 
who have tried to carry water on both shoulders, whose integrity I do not attack, but who have tried 
to act in a dual capacity and serve their own interest at the same time that they have served the in-
vestment trust.”).
18. Comment, supra note 7, at 446 (noting the Act contains several provisions that “directly 
attack the most obvious single weakness in former investment company practice—the complete lack 
of uniform provision for insuring the independence of management and its fidelity to its own stock-
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Congress agreed and made independent directors the “cornerstone”19 of the 
Act’s efforts to combat self-dealing.20 Independent directors are meant to serve 
“in the role of . . . watchdogs [and] ‘furnish an independent check upon’” fund 
management.21 This is why Section 10(a) requires that 40% of a fund’s board 
of directors have, for example, no “material business or professional relation-
ship[s]” with the fund or its adviser.22 Notably, the 40% quota23 is strengthened 
by the requirement in Section 15(c) that a majority of a fund’s independent di-
rectors approve significant transactions, such as the fund’s advisory and under-
writing contracts.24
Section 16(a) works hand-in-hand with Sections 10 and 15 by requiring 
shareholders to elect fund directors at meetings called for that purpose. Section 
16(a) thus provides shareholders with a say on fund management while also 
holders”); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF INV. MGMT., PROTECTING INVESTORS: A
HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION, at 473 (1992) (“The restrictions on affili-
ated transactions were enacted in 1940 in response to a wide array of abuses that occurred in the 
1920’s and 1930’s.”) [hereinafter 1992 SEC REPORT].
19. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 483 (1979).
20. House Hearings, supra note 9, at 109 (Schenker testified that “I think that is one of the 
most salutary provisions in this bill.”); Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 215 (Smith testifying inde-
pendent directors mitigate the occurrence of transactions where a fund’s interests do not come first);
see also Jaretzki, supra note 5, at 319–20 (noting the purpose of Section 10 is “(1) that it is desirable 
that all investment company transactions be subject to the scrutiny of at least a minority of directors 
independent of the management and (2) that in cases where affiliations of directors might involve 
conflicts of interest, stockholders are entitled to the protection afforded by the existence of a majori-
ty of disinterested directors”).
21. Burks, 441 U.S. at 484 (quoting House Hearings, supra note 9, at 109). In 1970, after 
further cooperation between the SEC and the fund industry, Congress amended the Act to reflect the 
lessons learned from the “dramatic surge of growth” of funds following World War II. See S. REP.
NO. 91-184 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 1970 WL 4899–900. The 1970 Amend-
ments introduced a new check on fund management by creating Section 36(b), which “imposed up-
on investment advisers a ‘fiduciary duty’ with respect to compensation received from a mutual fund, 
and granted individual investors a private right of action for breach of that duty.” Jones, 559 U.S. at 
340 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the legislative history regarding Section 36(b), see gen-
erally William P. Rogers & James N. Benedict, Money Market Management Fees: How Much is 
Too Much, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059 (1982).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(vii), (B)(vii). The 1970 Amendments also raised the bar for 
qualifying as an independent director by requiring such persons to be “disinterested” from, in addi-
tion to “unaffiliated” with, fund management. See S. REP. NO. 91-184 (1970), reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 1970 WL 4927–29.
23. In practice, independent directors now comprise 75% or more of most fund boards. See
INV. CO. INST. & INDEP. DIRS. COUNCIL, OVERVIEW OF FUND GOVERNANCE PRACTICES, 1994–
2018, at 6 (2019). Although the SEC tried to increase the 40% quota to 75% with the adoption of 
Rule 0-1 in 2004, the portion of the rule pertaining to the quota was invalidated after a judicial chal-
lenge. See Chamber of Commerce v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 412 F.3d 133, 137, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(also invalidating requirement that boards have independent chairs).
24. Another addition through the 1970 Amendments, Section 15(c) requires a fund board “to 
request and evaluate,” and the adviser “to furnish, such information as may reasonably be necessary 
to evaluate” advisory contracts; see also S. REP. NO. 91-184 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4897, 1970 WL 4903.
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preventing directors from secretly resigning and being replaced with adviser-
friendly nominees.25 Although the Act allows funds to appoint directors with-
out a shareholder vote if board vacancies occur between shareholder meetings, 
the Act prevents the exception from swallowing the rule by requiring that, after 
any such appointments, at least two-thirds of a board be comprised of directors 
who have been elected by shareholders.
To prevent the reoccurrence of the types of self-dealing that occurred prior 
to 1940, Congress also adopted the SEC’s and the fund industry’s suggestions 
for the Act to include:
• Section 15(a), to stop rogue advisers from increasing fund advisory 
fees without shareholder approval,26 selling their advisory contracts 
to the highest bidder without shareholder approval,27 and utilizing 
evergreen advisory contracts28;
• Section 17(a), to prevent rogue advisers from “dumping” their own 
unmarketable securities on their funds,29 offloading a flagship 
fund’s poorly performing investments to another one of their 
funds,30 or merging one of their funds into another fund that pays 
the adviser higher fees;31
25. See Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 254 (Schenker testified as to how “seriatim” resig-
nations and appointments of directors kept shareholders “in ignorance of changes or transfers of 
control.”); id. at 79–80 (statement of Hugh Fulton, federal prosecutor, testifying as to importance of 
fund director elections); see also SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 1877–78.
26. See Am. Century Inv. Mgmt., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2016 WL 7404628 (Dec. 20, 
2016).
27. See S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 7 (“[A]fter investors have invested in companies on their 
faith in the reputation and standing of the existing managements, control of the public’s funds has 
frequently been transferred without the prior knowledge or consent of stockholders to other persons 
who were subsequently guilty of gross mismanagement of the companies.”).
28. See Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 38 (Healy testified that “[i]nsiders give themselves 
long-term management contracts.”); see also SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 1920–21.
29. See Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 34 (Healy testifying to the “unloading of worthless 
securities and other investments of doubtful value upon the companies”); id. at 259 (Schenker 
providing example of insiders selling a stock that “was not doing well” to their fund at a substantial 
“premium above market”); see also Jaretzki, supra note 5, at 317–18 (“[T]here have been instances 
of investment houses selling securities to affiliated investment companies under circumstances 
which at worst constituted a conscious unloading of securities on the investment company and at 
best a bad bargain for the investment company.”).
30. See Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 260 (Schenker testified that “if one investment 
trust dominates the other investment trust, he should not be able to sell securities to the dominated 
investment trust without any scrutiny.”).
31. Investment Company Mergers, Investment Company Act Release No. 25259, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 57601, 57604 (proposed Nov. 15, 2001) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-8) (“A merger could 
result in an increase in fees and expenses borne by shareholders.”).
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• Section 17(e), to prohibit rogue advisers from routing fund transac-
tions to an affiliated broker-dealer that would charge the fund out-
sized commissions;32
• Section 10(f), to prevent rogue advisers from forcing funds to pur-
chase securities underwritten by an adviser affiliate at unmarketable 
prices;33
• Sections 17(f) and 17(g), to guard against insiders stealing fund as-
sets by governing the custody of fund assets and authorizing fidelity 
bonds, respectively;34
• Section 21, to shield funds from having to loan money or property to 
their advisers, often on unfair terms;35
32. See House Hearings, supra note 9, at 110 (Schenker testified that an adviser with an af-
filiated broker-dealer “may be motivated rapidly to turn over the portfolio of the trust, ‘churn it,’ in
order to increase its brokerage commissions.”); see also Jaretzki, supra note 5, at 318 (“Charges 
were made that securities of investment companies were turned over rapidly, that is to say, frequent 
switches were made in investments, not with a primary view to the good of the investment compa-
ny, but with one eye on brokerage commissions to be derived.”); Russell Inv. Mgmt., SEC Staff No-
Action Letter, 2016 WL 7321814 (Dec. 16, 2016) (“Section 17(e) was designed to eliminate the 
potential for self-dealing that exists when a person affiliated with a [fund] receives compensation in 
connection with transactions involving such [fund].”).
33. See Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 213 (Smith testified that it “creates a great many 
difficulties, when the investment company is in partnership with somebody who is in the underwrit-
ing business, who cannot afford to have long-term investments, and who is interested in it.”); see
also House Hearings, supra note 9, at 110 (Schenker testified that an adviser with an investment 
banking affiliate “may be impelled to have the investment company make an investment, not based 
upon investment quality of that investment, but because the particular investment may give him an 
‘in’ to get the banking business from the company whose securities the investment company 
bought.”); Exemption for the Acquisition of Securities During the Existence of an Underwriting or 
Selling Syndicate, Investment Company Act Release No. 22775 (July 31, 1997) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. § 270.10f-3) (noting fund “assets also could be used to absorb the risks of an underwriting in 
more subtle ways, such as by facilitating price stabilization in connection with an underwriting”).
L.M.C. Smith, Associate Counsel of the SEC Report, referred to this as a fund “being used, so to 
speak, as a bird dog for the investment banker” to drum up interest in a security controlled by an 
affiliate in an effort to spur additional sales of the security. See Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 
222.
34. See House Hearings, supra note 9, at 57 (Healy testified that due to the liquid nature of 
their assets, “an investment trust is often merely a safe-deposit box, and experience has proved, ra-
ther unhappily for some, that it is not too difficult to loot those boxes and to get away with their 
contents.”); see also Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 264 (Schenker describing sponsor embez-
zling from a fund); Custody of Investment Company Assets Outside the United States, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 21259 (July 25, 1995) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-5) (noting that
Section 17(f) is intended to ensure fund assets are “kept by financially secure entities that have suf-
ficient safeguards against misappropriation” (citation omitted)).
35. See Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 284–85 (statement of John H. Hollands, SEC At-
torney, testifying that Section 21 “deals [with] the problem of loans made for ulterior motives”); id.
at 37 (Healy testifying to the presence of “loans which investment companies have been caused to 
make to insiders”); id. at 207 (Smith testifying to same); see also Jaretzki, supra note 5, at 327 (Sec-
tion 21 “prevents in effect what are known as upstream loans, that is, loans from a subsidiary to a 
parent or to some company controlled by the parent.”).
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• Sections 22(g) and 23(a), to forestall a rogue adviser from forcing a 
fund to offer it and other insiders fund shares on unfair terms;36
• Section 12(b), to preclude rogue advisers from using fund assets to 
pay for distribution expenses to grow the fund in an effort to in-
crease advisory fee revenue;37 and
• In a subsequent addition, Section 17(j), which together with Rule 
17j-1, prohibits insiders from using material non-public information 
to “front run” a fund.38
Significantly, the Act relies on independent directors to reconcile the fact 
that a fund often benefits from the relationships that it has with its adviser, other 
funds managed by its adviser (“related funds”), and other adviser affiliates.
This is why certain rules under the Act—known as the “Exemptive Rules”—
allow conduct that is otherwise prohibited by the sections discussed above.39
The Exemptive Rules protect shareholders, however, by conditioning a fund’s 
ability to rely on them “on the approval or oversight of independent direc-
36. See Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 264 (Schenker noting this section stops the “prac-
tice in the old days of issuing stock of investment companies for personal service”); see also Jar-
etzki, supra note 5, at 327 (“It is evident that the prohibition against issuing securities for services or 
property other than cash and securities was designed to eliminate the possibility of overreaching or 
fraudulent practices on the part of so-called insiders.”); id. at 328 (noting closed-end funds were 
prohibited from selling shares at below net asset value because “the issuance of common stock to 
favored persons at less than true value was not an imaginary evil”).
37. See House Hearings, supra note 9, at 112 (Schenker noting Section 12(b) “protects the 
open-end company against excessive sales, promotion expenses, and so forth”); Inv. Co. Inst., SEC 
Staff No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 1543541 (Oct. 30, 1998) (“When a fund pays these expenses, the 
fund’s investment adviser is spared the cost of bearing the expenses itself, and the adviser benefits 
further if the fund’s expenditures result in an increase in the fund’s assets and a concomitant in-
crease in advisory fees.”) (citing Bearing of Distribution Expenses by Mutual Funds, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 10252, 43 Fed. Reg. 23589 (May 23, 1978)); see also Jaretzki, supra 
note 5, at 324–25 (“[T]he Commission was particularly fearful of the possibility that open-end in-
vestment companies in their formative stages might be made to shoulder the unprofitable burden of 
selling and distributing their shares during this period of heavy expense and small return.”). When 
the fund industry was faring poorly in the late 1970s, the SEC enacted Rule 12b-1 to permit the use 
of fund assets for distribution subject to independent director oversight. See 1992 SEC REPORT, su-
pra note 18, at 320–22.
38. Section 17(j) was added to the Act through the 1970 Amendments, see S. REP. NO. 91-
184 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 1970 WL 4924, but addressed conduct that was 
present in 1940, see Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 304 (Schenker testified that, while many 
funds already prohibited this, the SEC had found instances where insiders “trade in the securities or 
buy securities a little before the investment trust does, so that the insider is getting a free ride on the 
purchases of the stock by the investment trust.”).
39. Jaretzki, supra note 5, at 321 (“Any sweeping prohibition may involve hardship and un-
reasonable restraints and instead of protecting stockholders may, in specific cases, work to their 
disadvantage by preventing desirable transactions.”); see also Indep. Dirs. Council and Mut. Fund 
Dirs. F., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 4338476 (Nov. 2, 2010) (“A number of provisions 
of the Act and rules thereunder rely on fund boards to protect fund shareholders in conflict of inter-
est situations.”).
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tors,”40 which discourages overreaching while allowing funds to best serve 
shareholders. A few examples41 of the Exemptive Rules include:
• If one fund desires to sell a security at the same time a related fund 
desires to buy it (or vice versa), both funds will benefit by avoiding 
brokerage commissions if the funds can transact directly. Rule 17a-
7 thus allows such affiliated transactions provided parameters are 
met to ensure that securities are bought and sold at “current market 
price”;
• If a fund is faring poorly and would benefit from merging into a re-
lated fund (which could lead to lower combined fund expenses), it 
would be short-sighted to prohibit the transaction solely because the 
funds are affiliated. This is why Rule 17a-8 permits mergers involv-
ing affiliated funds subject to independent director approval;
• If an adviser affiliate is a broker-dealer, it would be ill-advised to 
reduce a fund’s liquidity options by forcing it to ignore that entity.
This is why Rule 17e-1 permits the use of affiliated broker-dealers 
provided parameters are met to ensure that the commissions paid by 
a fund are “reasonable and fair”;
• If a fund wishes to participate in an investment opportunity that is 
underwritten by an adviser affiliate, it would penalize shareholders 
to foreclose the opportunity. This is why Rule 10f-3 allows funds to 
purchase such securities provided that the fund pays no more than 
other purchasers, among other requirements; and
• If related funds can save shareholders money and reduce administra-
tive burdens by purchasing joint liability insurance policies and joint 
fidelity bonds, it would benefit no one to require separate policies 
for each fund. This is why Rules 17d-1(d)(7) and 17g-1 permit joint 
policies subject to independent director approval.
40. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26520, 69 
Fed. Reg. 46378, 46379 (Aug. 2, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 270.01). Funds seeking to rely on 
the Exemptive Rules must also abide by Rule 0-1, which seeks to “provide for greater fund board 
independence and . . . enhance the ability of fund boards to perform their important responsibilities 
under each of the rules.” Id. Rule 0-1 requires: (1) independent directors to select and nominate oth-
er independent directors; (2) counsel to independent directors to meet certain requirements meant to 
ensure their own independence; (3) boards to perform annual self-evaluations; (4) independent di-
rectors to meet on a quarterly basis outside the presence of any interested directors; and (5) have the 
authority to hire employees, advisors and/or experts. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.01 (2019). As enacted, 
Rule 0-1 also required boards to have independent chairs and be comprised of at least 75% inde-
pendent directors, but both requirements were invalidated by the judicial challenge referenced in 
note 23. Nevertheless, most boards now meet these standards. See Fund Governance Practices, su-
pra note 23, at 6, 10.
41. Other common Exemptive Rules include: Rule 12b-1 (permitting fund assets to be used 
to pay for distribution); Rule 15a-4 (permitting interim advisory contracts without shareholder ap-
proval); Rule 18f-3 (permitting funds to issue multiple share classes); and Rule 23c-3 (permitting 
the operation of “interval” funds by allowing closed-end funds to repurchase shares from investors).
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In this way, the Act and the Exemptive Rules counsel that if a fund would 
benefit from an affiliated transaction that is structured to prevent overreaching, 
then the fund should consider seeking exemptive or no-action relief. This is be-
cause the Exemptive Rules demonstrate that it is not the affiliated transaction 
that should be avoided, but rather, the effects of self-dealing. Thus, it makes 
sense to consider whether such a transaction is worthy of the “rubber”42 that al-
lows the Act to adapt to new situations.
II. PRINCIPLE NO. 2: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURE
Prior to the Act, the absence of regulation regarding shareholder disclosure 
contributed to rogue advisers engaging in “bait and switch” tactics whereby 
funds would offer one strategy and then change course without notice to or ap-
proval by shareholders.43 Similarly-inclined advisers also oversold key aspects 
of their funds when advertising.44 In response, the Act includes several 
measures that the SEC and the fund industry recommended to promote effective 
disclosure that investors can rely on.
It is fitting to start with Section 35(d) which, together with Rule 35d-1, pro-
hibits misleading fund names, such as a “Domestic Equity Fund” investing pri-
marily in foreign bonds.45 Next, Section 8(b) requires funds to file registration 
statements with the SEC, a portion of which serves as a fund’s prospectus and 
describes, among other things, the fund’s investment strategy, risks, and ex-
penses.46 Similar to Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 
34(b) of the Act prohibits untrue material statements and omissions in registra-
tion statements, among other filings.
Section 8(b) also requires a fund’s registration statement to disclose signifi-
cant structural elections and investment policies that impact shareholders. This 
includes the Section 5(a) election regarding whether a fund is open-ended or 
closed-ended, which determines how a fund provides its investors with liquidity 
(i.e., via redeemable shares versus relying on the market, respectively), and the 
42. See supra note 14.
43. Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 234 (Schenker describing a diversified fund becoming 
a concentrated private equity fund without shareholder notice or approval); S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 
7; see also Comment, supra note 7, at 444–45 (“Stockholders who had invested in self-styled diver-
sified companies were committed overnight to highly illiquid positions [in any] business which 
caught the managerial fancy.” (citation omitted)).
44. See Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 83–85 (statement of Carl S. Stern, SEC Attorney, 
testifying as to misleading advertisements utilized by a leading fund that suffered “staggering” loss-
es); see also Jaretzki, supra note 5, at 330 (noting “the character of supplemental sales literature”
was one of the “major complaints” discussed during the construction of the Act).
45. Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 312 (Schenker). A fund also cannot represent or imply 
that it is guaranteed or recommended by the federal government. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.35d-1(a)(1).
46. Rule 8b-16(a) functions to keep registration statements current by requiring updates 
within 120 days of a fund’s fiscal year end. Section 10(a)(3) of the Securities Act performs a similar 
function by stating that information in prospectuses cannot be more than sixteen months stale.
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Section 5(b) election regarding whether a fund is diversified or non-diversified, 
which determines how concentrated a fund may be in particular securities.47
Lastly, Section 8(b) requires funds to disclose their “fundamental” policies
and other policies that cannot be changed without a shareholder vote.  This in-
cludes, among other things, whether a fund’s investments may impact fund li-
quidity (e.g., can a fund concentrate its assets in specific industries, transact in 
real estate, or make loans) and how a fund maintains its capital structure (e.g.,
can it issue senior securities or borrow money). To prevent rogue advisers from 
unfairly changing these policies and structural elections, Section 13(a) requires 
consent from a majority of shares to do so.48
The Act also imposes ongoing disclosure obligations.49 For example, Sec-
tion 30(e) and Rule 30e-1 require funds to provide investors and the SEC50 with 
semi-annual and annual reports that describe, among other things, information 
relating to fund holdings, performance, financials, liquidity, and an explanation 
of why a fund’s directors approved the fund’s advisory contract.51 These re-
ports are of “fundamental importance” in keeping shareholders informed about 
their investments, as well as discouraging rogue advisers from taking “improper 
action” in the course of managing a fund.52
Fund advertising materials are subject to regulatory review for the same 
reason. Accordingly, Section 24(b) and Rule 24b-3 require certain sales litera-
ture to be filed with the SEC or a self-regulatory organization, such as the Fi-
47. See Comment, supra note 7, at 444 (“The most important registration and disclosure 
requirements depend upon this scheme of classification.”).
48. See House Hearings, supra note 9, at 59 (Healy testified that a “major problem in the 
case of management companies is created by the absence of any legal requirement for adherence to 
any announced investment policies or purposes. Such policies have often been radically changed 
without the knowledge or prior consent of stockholders.”); see also id. at 115 (Schenker testifying to 
same); Jaretzki, supra note 5, at 315–17 (“The above provisions are intended to meet this problem 
by preventing any fundamental change in the character of the business to be conducted without 
stockholders’ approval.”).
49. See Comment, supra note 7, at 442 (noting many fund abuses grew out of “meagre, and 
often misleading, reports to stockholders”); see also House Hearings, supra note 9, at 59 (Healy 
testified that “financial reports to stockholders of management investment companies frequently are 
deficient and inadequate in many respects and oftentimes misleading.”).
50. See Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 303 (Healy testifying this section seeks to avoid 
situations where the SEC received one annual report while investors received a rosier version).
51. Form N-1A, Items 27(b)–(d).
52. Jaretzki, supra note 5, at 341–42 (“The requirements for extensive disclosure in reports 
to the Commission and to stockholders . . . are very effective restraints on improper action. The 
prophylactic effect of publicity requirements is too generally recognized to need discussion here. 
Suffice it to say that even transactions honestly believed to have been entered into in good faith of-
ten look quite different in the broad glare of public scrutiny.”); see also id. at 338 (“True, the extent 
to which the average individual is enlightened by the vast amount of information shoved at him by 
the various securities acts is problematical. But experience seems to indicate that the requirement 
that such information be given has a salutary effect on corporations and managements, particularly 
when such information is subject to the scrutiny of a federal agency.”).
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nancial Industry Regulatory Association (FINRA), under the assumption that 
such a submission process “will tend to curb excesses.”53
Notably, a 2019 “no-action” letter regarding an index fund (i.e., a fund that 
seeks to track the return of a particular index) demonstrates how the Principle of 
effective disclosure can help to apply the Act.54 In this instance, the fund’s sub-
ject index was becoming increasingly concentrated in certain stocks, which 
made it likely that the diversified fund would have to change its Section 5(b)
election to that of non-diversified. Due to Section 13(a), this would require 
shareholder approval, which is costly and risks a change in investment strategy.
As a result, the fund sought no-action relief to forego a shareholder vote and 
instead disclosed that changes in the index could make the fund more concen-
trated. By seeking to keep shareholders informed, the fund’s request respected 
the concerns embodied in Sections 5 and 13 while minimizing the chances for 
disrupting shareholders. And since requiring a shareholder vote to allow the 
fund to perform the very task that it promised to shareholders threatened to ele-
vate form over function, the request was granted. In this way, the SEC and the 
fund worked together to promote the investor protection purposes of the Act 
while finding a commonsense outcome.
III. PRINCIPLE NO. 3: ENSURING THE EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF 
SHAREHOLDERS
With funds serving the needs of “Main Street,” the Act seeks to protect in-
vestors from sophisticated schemes.55 This is evidenced by the Act’s response 
to “pyramiding,” excessive uses of leverage, voting abuses, and suspensions of 
the right of redemption.
Prior to 1940, pyramiding was used to employ hostile yet stealthy fund 
takeovers.56 A pyramiding party would invest significantly in a “Small Fund”
53. Id. at 330 n.73; Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 295–96 (Hollands testified that Section 
24(b) “does not attempt to specify what goes into the literature, but merely requires that what goes 
in it be truthful and not misleading” after describing situations where rogue advisers would, upon 
SEC request, remove certain statements from prospectuses and “then, promptly, [put] those same 
representations . . . in the follow-up literature.”).
54. See Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young, LLP, SEC No-Action Letter, 2019 WL 2575074 
(June 24, 2019).
55. See SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 32 (“[A] considerable portion of the capital raised by 
[funds] represents the participation of widely scattered small security holders, who were virtually 
powerless to exercise any concerted effort to prevent or eliminate various malpractices and defi-
ciencies, or to remove incompetent or dishonest management.”); Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 
38 (“[S]eriousness of these abuses [identified by the SEC] is intensified by the fact that holders of 
investment company securities are peculiarly investors in the low-income brackets.”).
56. See SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 2730 (“[T]he unrestricted ability of one investment 
company to purchase the shares of a similar company opens the way to the application to invest-
ment companies of the holding-company device as a means for the centralization of the control and 
management of such companies. Fundamentally, the use of investment companies as holding com-
panies for other investment companies is a denial of the purported economic function of such com-
panies.”).
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in order to gain control through the threat of large redemptions and an outsized 
influence in director elections. The pyramiding party would then cause the 
Small Fund to act in its interests or use the Small Fund’s assets to invest in and 
commandeer the assets of a “Large Fund” which, in a repeat of the process, 
would let the pyramiding party control the Larger Fund and serve its interests to 
even greater effect.57
This was problematic for shareholders who, due to the complicated struc-
tures involved, were generally unaware that their investments were being man-
aged to benefit the pyramiding party. Ultimately, this led to a “layering” of fees 
whereby an investor in the acquiring fund paid that fund’s fees in addition to 
those of the acquired fund58 and the pyramiding party engaging in the types of 
overreaching that inspired the Act.59 In response, Section 12(d)(1)(A)60 limits 
the stake that one fund can take in another (no more than 3% of another fund’s
shares) and how concentrated a fund can be in other funds (no more than 5% of 
a fund can be invested in one fund and no more than 10% of a fund can be in-
vested in funds generally).61
57. See House Hearings, supra note 9, at 112 (Schenker noted that this “situation was not 
unusual in the past. An Investment Company would buy a controlling interest in B Investment 
Company, which in turn would buy a controlling interest in C Investment Company. As a conse-
quence, you had pyramiding of investment companies, systems with complicated capital structures 
with all of the difficulties of pyramided systems.”).
58. Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 238 (Schenker testified that “[y]ou are not only pyra-
miding capital structures, but you are pyramiding the management fees. I do not want to appear 
brusque, Senator, but it seems to me that a situation like this just does not make sense.”); SEC
REPORT, supra note 3, at 2727 (pyramiding led to “uneconomic duplication of management and 
other operating expenses”); see also 1992 SEC REPORT, supra note 18, at 107. The SEC was also 
concerned that pyramiding deprives shareholders of the ability to receive advice from the adviser 
they chose, as well as allowing an acquiring fund to circumvent its investment policies by investing 
in a fund with less restrictive policies. See SEC Report, supra note 3, at 2725–26.
59. For example, pyramiding parties influenced funds to: (1) purchase securities in compa-
nies that the pyramiding party had an interest in; (2) purchase securities from the pyramiding party 
on unfair terms; (3) use broker-dealers affiliated with the pyramiding party for fund transactions; 
and (4) if the pyramiding party managed its own funds, cause any controlled funds to purchase 
shares of those funds, which led to the pyramiding party receiving additional advisory fees. See
Fund of Funds Investments, Investment Company Act Release No. 26198, 68 Fed. Reg. 58226, 
58226–27 (proposed Oct. 8, 2003).
60. See 1992 SEC REPORT, supra note 18, at 107 (“Section 12(d)(1) is intended to restrict 
the pyramiding of funds”); see also Jaretzki, supra note 5, at 325 (“The most important prohibition 
in Section 12 is that designed to prevent pyramiding.”); House Hearings, supra note 9, at 112 
(Schenker testifying to same).
61. The so-called “3-5-10” limits are the result of the 1970 Amendments and strengthened 
the original permutation of Section 12(d)(1), which solely focused on registered funds purchasing
other funds. Because unregistered funds took advantage of this by taking large positions in regis-
tered funds, Section 12(d)(1) was amended to include subsection (A), which imposes the abovemen-
tioned limits, and subsection (B), which sets similar limits on registered funds selling their shares to 
other funds. See S. REP. NO. 91-184 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 1970 WL 4925.
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At the same time, the Act recognizes that funds can benefit from investing 
in other funds.62 For example, an adviser may invest a fund’s cash in another 
fund until a better investment is available or to access a unique investment strat-
egy. Because Section 12(d)(1) may be too restrictive in such cases, the Act and 
its rules offer exceptions that allow for increased fund of fund investments, but 
only if an acquiring fund abides by limitations that prevent it from unduly influ-
encing an acquired fund.63 In doing so, the Act succeeds in addressing the 
abuses associated with pyramiding while preserving a portfolio management 
tool that can help funds to “meet their investment objectives in an efficient 
manner.”64
Section 18 likewise protects shareholders from unfair management practices 
by regulating fund capital structures and ensuring equitable voting rights. First, 
subsections (a) and (f) limit how funds65 can leverage their assets through the 
issuance of senior securities.66 Prior to the Act, excessive uses of leverage, 
meant to boost fund returns, often had the opposite effect67 due to the way lev-
erage “magnifies” the gain or loss of a transaction—sometimes without limits—
and introduces too much of a “speculative character” to retail investments.68
62. See House Hearings, supra note 9, at 112 (Schenker noted that “you may get situations 
where one investment company may think that the securities of another investment company are a
good buy and it was not thought advisable to freeze that type of purchase.”).
63. For example, Section 12(d)(1)(F) permits funds to hold up to 3% of the shares of an un-
limited number of other funds if the acquiring fund: (1) seeks voting instructions from the acquired 
fund’s shareholders or votes such proxies in the same manner as other acquired fund shareholders 
(i.e., “echo” votes the shares); (2) agrees to limits on how much and how quickly the acquiring fund 
can redeem its shares; and (3) abides by limits on the sales load it can charge. More recently, the 
SEC adopted Rule 12d1-4, which also allows funds to make investments in excess of the limits im-
posed by Section 12(d)(1) if the acquiring fund abides by control and voting limitations that pro-
mote the “protection of investors.” Fund of Fund Arrangements, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 34045 (Oct. 2, 2020) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 270.12d1-4).
64. Fund of Fund Arrangements, Securities Act Release No. 10590, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 33329 (Dec. 19, 2018).
65. Section 18 applies different limits to open-end and closed-end funds. In general, Section 
18(f) prohibits an open-end fund from issuing or selling any senior security save for borrowing from 
a bank and subject to maintaining 300% asset coverage of the borrowed amount. For closed-end 
funds, Section 18(a) prohibits the issuance or selling of any “senior security [that] represents an in-
debtedness” unless there is 300% asset coverage. Closed-end funds may also issue preferred shares 
subject to maintaining 200% asset coverage for such shares.
66. The SEC considers derivatives and similar instruments to be senior securities if they re-
sult in an “evidence of indebtedness” for purposes of Section 18, as such transactions create “a con-
ditional or unconditional contractual obligation to pay in the future.” Use of Derivatives by Regis-
tered Investment Companies and Business Development Companies, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 31933, 80 Fed. Reg. 80884, 80887–90 (proposed Dec. 28, 2015) (citing Securities 
Trading Practices of Registered Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 
10666, 44 Fed. Reg. 25128, 25131 (Apr. 27, 1979) [hereinafter 10666 Release]).
67. See SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 18–19.
68. See House Hearings, supra note 9, at 69 (Healy noting that “[y]ou do not want these 
things to be wildly speculative”); see also 10666 Release, supra note 66, at 25129 (“Leveraging of 
an investment company’s portfolio through the issuance of senior securities and through borrowing 
magnifies the potential for gain or loss on monies invested and, therefore, results in an increase in 
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The SEC, however, has long sought to balance the concerns underlying Sec-
tion 18 with the “valuable role” that leverage can play in portfolio management, 
because funds can use derivatives, for example, to hedge risk or obtain efficient 
exposure to many types of assets.69 The SEC thus regulates how funds use de-
rivatives and similar instruments and, pursuant to Rule 18f-4, requires funds to 
employ, among other things, “formalized” derivatives risk management pro-
grams that establish “an outer limit on fund leverage risk.”70
Next, by requiring equal voting rights among fund shares, the “one share, 
one vote” principle enshrined in Section 18(i) ensures that shareholders remain 
on proportionately equal footing with each other. The SEC and the fund indus-
try recommended this provision to rectify how small groups of shareholders 
were found to have received special voting privileges that allowed a minority of 
shares to control an entire fund.71 This ensures the viability of Sections 13(a), 
15(a), and 16(a), which require shareholder approval to change fundamental 
policies and structural elections, raise advisory fees, and elect directors, respec-
tively. In this way, Section 18(i) guards against the evils of “taxation without 
representation” from being visited upon shareholders.72
And, lastly, by including Section 22(e), which requires open-end funds to 
pay out redemptions at net asset value within seven days, the Act protects one 
the speculative character of the investment company’s outstanding securities. Leveraging without 
any significant limitation was identified . . . as one of the major abuses of investment companies 
prior to the passage of the Act.”).
69. See Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies and Business Development 
Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 34084 (Nov. 2, 2020) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 
270.18f-4) [hereinafter Derivatives Adopting Release].
70. Id. Prior to the adoption of Rule 18f-4, the SEC allowed funds to enter transactions that 
give rise to leverage if funds used “segregated accounts” to “cover” such positions. This approach 
sought to institute a “practical limit on the amount of leverage” a fund can have, which, in turn, lim-
its a fund’s “risk of loss.” 10666 Release, supra note 66. The new approach relies on, among other 
requirements: (1) a derivatives risk management program, which is administered by a fund board-
approved derivatives risk manager; (2) limits on a fund’s leverage risk, as calculated pursuant to a 
“value at risk” test that seeks to “analyze whether a fund is using derivatives transactions to lever-
age the fund’s portfolio” as opposed to other purposes that “may be less likely to raise the concerns 
underlying Section 18”; (3) annual fund board oversight of a fund’s use of derivatives; and (4) SEC 
reporting obligations on a fund’s use of derivatives. See Derivatives Adopting Release, supra note 
69.
71. See Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 240 (Schenker describing “one of the numerous 
instances that persuaded us to make provision that the persons who really own the company, at least 
ought to have a vote in some instances”); see also id. at 71–72 (Fulton testifying to the use of voting 
classes to permit a small class of holders to exercise control over funds); id. at 218 (Smith testifying 
to same); SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 1875–96 (same); Jaretzki, supra note 5, at 333 (same).
72. This is particularly helpful for shareholders who face “impediments to redemption” and 
may be reluctant to vote with their feet due to, for example, the tax implications associated with 
fund redemptions. See 1992 SEC REPORT, supra note 18, at 260, 273, 276. Section 18(i) protects 
such shareholders by ensuring that each has notice of and a say in any changes that stand to “dra-
matically alter[] the nature of the shareholders’ investment, requiring in effect, a new investment 
decision.” Id. at 273.
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of the “defining characteristics” of open-end funds.73 Prior to the Act, rogue 
advisers would advertise their open-end funds as offering redeemable shares, 
but then close funds to thwart redemptions and preserve their management 
fees.74 This is why Section 22(e) provides that, absent extraordinary circum-
stances, open-end funds cannot suspend the right of redemption or unfairly de-
lay payment of redemption proceeds, which ensures that a shareholder’s in-
vestment remains the province of the investor.75
Taken together, the Act’s responses to pyramiding, excessive uses of lever-
age, voting abuses, and suspensions of the right of redemption evidence the be-
lief of Congress, the SEC, and the fund industry, that shareholders deserve a fair 
deal. By preventing the use of public funds for insider gain (the result of pyra-
miding and voting abuses), speculation (the result of excessive uses of lever-
age), and illiquidity in open-end funds (the result of suspensions of the right of 
redemption), the Act seeks to let investors focus on using funds to help their 
lives as opposed to avoiding sophisticated business schemes.76
CONCLUSION
For the past eighty years, the Act has served as a successful regulatory 
framework because its provisions are commonsense measures meant to solve 
real-world problems. By highlighting those problems and adding context for 
the Act’s provisions, the three guiding Principles make the Act more accessible 
because it is easier, if not instinctive, to apply rules that make sense.
To ensure another successful eighty years, in addition to remembering why 
the Act was necessary, we should remember how the Act was created—as a
product of extraordinary cooperation between the SEC and the fund industry.
By engaging in “intensive,”77 “constructive,” and good faith”78 discussions, the 
SEC and the fund industry forged compromises that have kept pace with eco-
73. See SEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 799–801 (collecting examples of redemption gates).
74. See Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 291 (Schenker describes instances where “alt-
hough the fellow . . . bought it in reliance upon the fact that he could come to the company and ten-
der his certificate and get the value of the certificate upon request, there is buried somewhere in the 
trust indenture a provision saying that the management under certain circumstances can either sus-
pend it for a short period or, in some instances, for a comparatively long period.”).
75. Although most open-end funds pay out redemptions in less than seven days, to further 
protect investors, the SEC adopted Rule 22e-4 in 2016, which among other things, requires funds to 
institute liquidity risk management programs in an effort to reduce “the risk that a fund will be una-
ble to meet its obligations to redeeming shareholders . . . while also minimizing the impact of those 
redemptions on the fund.” Investment Company Liquidity Risk Management Programs, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 32315, 81 Fed. Reg. 82, 142–43 (Nov. 18, 2016) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 
270.22e-4).
76. Cf. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PATH TO POWER 39 (Vin-
tage Books 1982) (describing the role of government as a helping force “when men found them-
selves at the mercy of forces too big for them to fight alone”).
77. S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 1.
78. See House Hearings, supra note 9, at 63 (Healy).
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nomic cycles, technological advances, and product innovations. As asset man-
agement grows more complex, which will challenge both the fund industry and 
the SEC, we should keep in mind that our framework works best when we work 
together.
In this way, it is apt to end with the words of Senator Robert F. Wagner, 
then Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency and the Sub-
committee that oversaw the Act’s creation, who reflected on the cooperation 
that made the Act possible by noting that: “notwithstanding people may appear 
to be very far apart . . . when they actually sit down at a table and look at one 
another and talk to one another, in 99 cases out of 100 they reach an agreement.
I think all too often we keep apart when we should sit down and talk things 
over.”79
79. See Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 1130; accord id. at 1122 (Healy testifying “if you 
can sit down around a table with a group of people who are interested in a particular subject and 
discuss what a rule ought to be, I think you accomplish a great deal more than when you make a 
formal record and have a lawyer make a speech.”).

